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Public rhetoric distinguishes between ‘faith-perspectives’ and those perspectives which should determine public policy in a modern democracy. ‘Faith-perspectives’ are private or group matters, optional at the personal level, but to be left at the gateway when we enter the public square. Behind this way of thinking there are assumptions about the nature of reason, the nature of faith, and the relationship of faith and reason, which we need to probe.

Postmodernity has accustomed us to the claim that there is no such thing as objective, neutral, universal ‘reason’. If we try to establish a standard of normative reasonableness, we are antiquated intellectual imperialists. However, public rhetoric has little postmodern about it for most of the time. Politicians and public figures speak as though the evils of poverty, torture or discrimination were objectively identifiable evils, which every reasonable person should oppose. Whether postmodern thought of or political rhetoric is correct does not matter for a moment. What matters is that, if we were to investigate much of what we are told is ‘reasonable’ in a pluralistic, liberal democracy, we should find that these are as much based on faith as is any religious conviction. Secular ‘reason’ often masks and is underpinned by a secular ‘faith’. It needs to give an account of itself as much as any faith-perspective needs to give an account of itself.

On the other hand, ‘faith-perspectives’ are often grounded in reasons that can be given for such a perspective. In debates over cosmology and cosmogony, religious believers will sometimes cry out that any ‘reasonable’ person will admit that the existence of the cosmos is inexplicable except on the basis of belief in God. Talk of God is thus not a matter of faith as opposed to reason; it is, on the contrary, the only reasonable way to proceed. Again, I am not concerned about the question of whether arguments for the existence of God are or are not persuasive. But it is fair enough to ask ‘secular’ folk who marginalize faith-perspectives in public life why it is that they regard it as reasonable to say that the universe has an origin of the kind described by Terry Pratchett in terms of: ‘In the beginning was nothing; then it exploded’. For if there is such a thing as ‘reason’ and if this ‘reason’ counts for anything, it might turn out that what is now regarded as an optional ‘faith-perspective’ – the existence of God – is the most ‘reasonable’ option available. In which case, why should public institutions be steered by the less reasonable assumption, namely, that there is no God?

I underline that I have refrained from commenting on arguments mentioned above and, whatever we make of them, independent questions arise about the basis of public policy today. But I think that we ought to unmask the rhetoric. Christians can often be defensive: before the secular tribunal we have to either justify our beliefs or justify giving them a role in the public place. However, Christians must also interrogate. What are the bases of secular conclusions? Wherein lies the rigour of secular reasoning? For just as religious faith is often a tool for wielding power, so is secular reason. We need to be clear on that and to say it.

Stephen Williams